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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD
To me, at least, the most valuable
part of our routine work consists of
our regular semi-weekly conferences
en banc. Opinions are discussed and
read with the utmost freedom and
candor, but always in a friendly way.
Errors, whenever apparent, are recti-
fied, and no pride of opinion prevents
any man from altering his viewpoint
if convinced that he is wrong, as all
men sometimes are.
The editors of the Record requested
the learned Chief Justice to prepare
this article for publication. It is to be
regretted that his multitudinous duties
prevented him from doing so. He
asked me to do it for him, which has
resulted in these random thoughts of
mine. They are penned in friendship
and good will to the members of the
bar, to whom we acknowledge our-
selves immeasurably indebted for
their splendid assistance in carrying
on the work of the court.
"The District Court"
By CHARLES C. SACKMANN, Judge
HE District Court, as we know
that institution in Colorado at
the present time, it being an
evolution of the district courts of Ter-
ritorial days, came into being by vir-
tue of the constitutional provision
known as Article VI, Section One,
adopted March 14th, 1876, and going
into full force and effect August 1st,
1876, upon the issuance of the procla-
mation of Ulysses S. Grant, President
of the United States, admitting to the
Union the State of Colorado.
This Section, as amended in 1886
and 1912, comes to us today reading:
"The judicial power of the State as
to all matters of law and equity, ex-
cept as in the Constitution other-
wise provided, shall be vested in the
supreme Court, district courts, coun-
ty court, and such other courts as
may be provided by law. In coun-
ties and cities and counties having
a population exceeding 100,000, ex-
clusive original jurisdiction in cases
involving minors and persons whose
offenses concern minors may be
vested in a separate court now or
hereafter established by law."
Four judicial districts, with one
judge in each, were originally provid-
ed for by the Constitution, by Sections
12 and 13 of Article VI, and as provid-
ed by the Constitution these were
gradually increased by statute, be-
tween the years 1891 and 1921 inclu-
sive, to the present number of four-
teen judicial districts, presided over
by twenty-six District Judges.
Section 11 of Article VI originally
provided that,
"The District Courts shall have or-
iginal jurisdiction of all causes, both
at law and in equity, and such appel-
late jurisdiction as may be confer-
red by law. They shall have origin-
al jurisdiction to determine all con-
troversies upon relation of any per-
son on behalf of the people, concern-
ing the rights, duties and liabilities
of railroad, telegraph or toll road
companies or corporations",
and so stands today.
Into the maw of this judicial ma-
chine are fed all manner of cases in-
volving questions of law and equity,
mounting now into the thousands
every year; in this judicial district, 4386
cases last year. Into this melting pot
are poured every conceivable question
involving interpretation of the laws,
questions of procedure in legal mat-
ters, and the application of the proper
remedy or remedies to the case in
hand, and out of this alloy are cast in
the form of opinions of the judges in
the various courts, the final decisions
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of the court, subject only to review by
the Supreme Court of this State.
Section 27 of Article VI of the Con-
stitution also provides that,
"The judges of courts of record in-
ferior to the Supreme Court shall on
or before the first day of July in
each year report in writing to the
judges of the Supreme Court such
defects and omissions in the laws as
their knowledge and experience may
suggest, and the judges of the Su-
preme Court shall, on or before the
first day of December of each year,
report in writing to the Governor, to
be by him transmitted to the gen-
eral assembly", etc.
The above, together with the per-
formance of the marriage ceremony
now and then are all mental gymnas-
tics which no doubt were provided to
take care of any stray moments that
might be found by the judges to be
unoccupied, and come as rather an
eye-opener to the neophyte on the
bench.
Practicing for twenty-one years be-
fore our honorable courts, I became,
as do most lawyers, imbued with the
idea that judges are so saturated with
legal learning that all legal questions
are ancient history, so to speak, to
them, and then to be rudely awakened
to the fact that the ingenuity of coun-
sel in finding eminent authority on both
sides of every question-continually
drives the judges to burning midnight
oil in a frantic endeavor to find the
weight of authority, is disconcerting
to say the least.
While the provisions of the Consti-
tution, as to the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court, seem to be all inclusive,
some interesting questions have aris-
en on these matters because of the
wording of certain other provisions of
the Constitution and statutes of this
state as to the jurisdiction of the
County Court and the Juvenile Court,
and by virtue of the interpretation
placed upon these provisions by our
Honorable Supreme Court, certain cur-
tailments have come about in the orig-
inal jurisdiction of our District Courts.
In this connection it is interesting
to note that although the District
Court is given original jurisdiction of
all matters at law and in equity in the
Constitution, nevertheless, the County
Court, by Section 23 of Article VI of
the Constitution, is given original jur-
isdiction in all matters of probate, set-
tlement of estates of deceased persons,
appointment of guardians, conserva-
tors and administrators and settle-
ment of their accounts, and that by a
most interesting series of decisions in
our Supreme Court it is now rather
well settled that the District Court has
no original jurisdiction in these mat-
ters, concurrent with the County
Court, but that the jurisdiction of that
Court in the first instance is sole and
exclusive, and the District Court has
only appellate jurisdiction therein. I
am quoting these cases herein for
those who may desire to peruse them
in this connection.
Clement v. Fox, 25 Colo., 39;
In re estate of Brown, Lunatic, 65
Colo., 341;
Glenn v. Mitchell, 71 Colo., 394;
Currier v. Johnson, 19 C. A., 94;
Berry v. French, 24 C. A., 522.
Another development along this line
has to do with the constitutional pro-
visions and statutes relating to the
juvenile courts.
The constitutional amendment of
1912, Const. 1921, Art. VI, Sec. 1, gave
the legislature power to give the Ju-
venile Court exclusive jurisdiction of
matters involving minors. In 1923,
the legislature enacted Chapter 78 of
that year, saying, in reference to ju-
venile courts, and eliminating the
parts not pertinent to this discussion,
"Such courts shall have coordinate
jurisdiction with the District and
County Court in certain cases. Such
courts shall also****have exclusive
jurisdiction, subject to appeals and
writs of error,****in all cases con-
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cerning neglected, dependent or de-
linquent children,****custody or dis-
position of children and the care and
protection of their persons from neg-
lect, cruelty, abuse.****Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to revoke
or interfere with the jurisdiction,
practice or proceedings as now pro-
vided by law in other courts of rec-
ord in this state, in cases in such
court relating to the custody or dis-
position of children in divorce cases,
****provided that the disposition of
the custody of children in any di-
vorce case shall not be held to in-
terfere with the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court in cases concerning
the dependency of such children un-
der the laws of this state concerning
dependent children."
The Supreme Court, in attempting
to harmonize the various sentences in
this Act, reached the conclusion that
the Juvenile Court, having exclusive
jurisdiction in matters concerning the
dependency of children, is not to be
deprived of that jurisdiction by pro-
ceedings with reference to children in
divorce actions in the District Court;
that the District Court may proceed in
such actions with regard to children
as heretofore, subject to the power of
the Juvenile Court to deal with those
children exclusively if they are or be-
come dependent, the final result being
that although a case be pending in the
District Court in divorce, and orders
entered by that Court for the tempor-
ary or permanent custody of children
by the filing of a dependency action in
the Juvenile Court, the District Court
is temporarily ousted of all jurisdic-
tion over the children until that issue
is determined in the Juvenile Court.
People vs. Juvenile Court, 75 Colo.
493.
While this conclusion is sound in
logic and reasoning, because of the
confusion in the wording of the Act,
nevertheless, having been a member
of the legislative body which passed
this Act, and having personally had a
great deal to do with the matter in
the House of Representatives, I know
that such was not the intention of the
legislative body, and that the wording
of the Act,
"Nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued to revoke or interfere with
the jurisdiction, practice or proceed-
ings as now provided by law in other
courts of record in this State, in
cases in such court relating to the
custody or disposition of children in
divorce cases,"
was taken and understood by the leg-
islators as avoiding the situation
which has now arisen by virtue of this
decision.
As to the litigants and attorneys, I
have been impressed in two ways:
First, by the lack of familiarity on the
part of attorneys and litigants with
the rules of the court, as for instance,
that motions to strike should be set
out verbatim as to the matter to be
stricken, etc.; that all motions except
of course should be in writing; that
cases are assigned by chance to the
various divisions, and no attempt
should be made to interfere with this
rule; that time for argument of mo-
tions shall be limited to fifteen min-
utes, etc.; that judges are prohibited
from counseling, advising or perform-
ing any services relating to the prac-
tice of law.
But more particularly I have been
impressed with the fundamental rev-
erence, confidence and finality with
which both litigants and attorneys
present their disputes to the judgment
of the courts, and their willingness
when judgments are carefully, con-
scientiously and justly entered, to
abide by the judgment of the Court.
Such respect and confidence for the
courts places an immense responsibil-
ity upon the shoulders of our judges
and must needs furnish an ideal that
will always be a guiding star for the
individual judge, driving and urging
him always to greater effort, and de-
sire to be careful, right, just and con-
scientious in all his work and deal-
ings with litigants and attorneys, so
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that this confidence and faith may
never, so far as is humanly possible,
be violated.
Somewhere I have read and had
burned into my mind these words:
"All true laws and all human justice
are but the developments of that
infinite justice which is of the es-
sence of the deity. He who assumes
to judge his brethren, clothes him-
self with a power like that of God.
Act so that men may praise Thy
moderation, Thine inflexibility, Thy
equity and Thine integrity. Regard
not alone the judgment of the living
but seek the approval of those who
shall live hereafter, whose verdict
will be more just even if more se-
vere. Woe unto thee, if being thy-
self unworthy, vicious or criminal,
thou dost assume to judge others
and still more if thou givest cor-
rupt judgment for then will thy
memory be execrated."
This might well be a creed for every
judge on the Bench, and I am sure
expresses their conception of their du-
ties as such.
Mr. Jarndyce in the Twentieth Century
By WAYNE C. WILLI AMS, of The Denver Bar
T is now 75 years since Dickens'
immortal lawsuit first appeared in
the pages of "Bleak House". It is
the most noted lawsuit that ever was
tried-in fiction-and even today the
mere mention of "Jarndyce vs. Jarn-
dyce" brings a smile of recognition to
the face of every lawyer and every
reader of the immortal Victorian nov-
elist.
And who has not read him? Not to
have read Dickens is to miss the best
English novels that reveal the true
conditions in England in the Victorian
age.
Of course the book stands are
groaning under the load of novels that
pour out of the presses almost weekly;
of course there have been literally
thousands of books since Dickens
wrote and yet here is literary quality
that persists and-
But this is not a literary treatise;
this is a purely legal document, about
purely legal matters, viz: to wit: the
English Chancery practice.
Since this is not a book review we
cannot stop to moralize on the affairs
of Richard and Ada, of Mr. Guppy and
Mr. Turveydrop. We may lament the
death of Jo (that masterpiece of fic-
tion) and enjoy the whimsical doings
of Mr. Skimpole-
"God save the mark",-but we can-
not stop to analyze these historic char-
acters.
There is no doubt about the inner
motive that prompted Dickens to
write his legal masterpiece; he set
out to point the finger of ridicule at
the ancient, slow English Chancery
Practice and he did it with a master
hand.
Dickens hated the whole system of
chancery; he had hated it from the
days when he studied law and droned
through old English cases as a re-
porter; he had no stomach or taste for
the law and hating the delays of the
law he overlooked its vital relation to
the rights of men and the security of
property; he missed its logical struc-
ture, its profound relation to the
growth of human society; its larger
aspects in a world of law. All this
the brilliant English novelist was a
complete stranger to. He saw the de-
fects of ancient chancery practice and
he dipped his pen in unusually vitri-
olic ink and began his assault.
Nothing was ever better done. When
critics, smarting under the keen satire
